Recent Cases: Constitutional Law. Religious Freedom. Compulsory Military Training by Editors, Law Review
RECENT CASES
existed before the enactment of the statute, the legislature may have had a "logical
basis" for continuing the differential during the emergency in order to maintain the
same facilities for distribution, to the end that both milk producers and consumers
would be benefited. Cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rigid housing regulation
during an emergency sustained).
An undesirable feature of the price differential, not mentioned by the court, is that
it was definitely fixed at a certain amount by the statute. N.Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws
(supp. 1933), c. 1, § 317. If the purpose of the statute is to maintain the balance of
bargaining power, it seems that an administrative board would be in a better position
to adapt the differential to changing conditions. See People of N.Y. ex rel. Liberman
v. Van de Carr, i99 U.S. 552 (1905).
The conservatism of the opinion in the principal case may indicate that the lib-
eral Nebbia decision will not be applied as extensively as has been suggested. See 82
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 61g (1934).
Constitutional Law-Religious Freedom-Compulsory Military Training-
[U.S.].-Plaintiffs, students at the University of California, a state university, had
been suspended on their refusal, because of conscientious religious objections to war, to
take a compulsory course in military science in the Reserve Officers Training Corps
offered by the university as a land grant college under the Morrill Act, 7 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3OI-308 (1927). In a suit by plaintiffs for reinstatement, held, that though the due
process clause of the 14 th amendment may protect religious liberty, it confers no
right to attend a land grant college free from the compulsory military training require-
ment. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (r934).
The same result was reached in Pearson v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (i933),
cert. denied 290 U.S. 597 (1933)-
Despite the fact that it has been held that states have almost unlimited power to de-
termine the conditions of attendance in state schools; North v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (i8gi) (trustees can make chapel attend-
ance compulsory); Waugt v. Board of Trustees of the University of Miss., 237 U.S. 589
(19X5) (requirement that students not belong to fraternities held constitutional); it can
be argued that an "arbitrary and unreasonable" regulation violates the protection giv-
en the liberty to acquire an education by the due process clause. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 39 o, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5xo, 518 (1925).
Although the i 4 th amendment has been quite consistently held not to apply the re-
strictions on the federal government contained in the first ten Amendments to the
states; Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (3872); Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (Igo8); in
the principal case the court assumed "that the religious liberty protected against in-
vasion by the nation in the ist Amendment is protected by the 14 th Amendment
against invasion by the States." Cf. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (I925); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697 (193i). See Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law (1932), 1366, 1367;
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927), 983.
Religious liberty, however, has been held to be limited when the exercise of the re-
ligious belief would contravene a well-established governmental policy. Reynolds v.
U.S., o8 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious liberty does not excuse polygamy); People v. Pierson,
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (failure to call a physician); Sweeney v. Webb, 33
Tex. Civ. App. 324, 76 S.W. 766 (x9o3) (use of sacramental wine).
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Maintenance of an adequate national defense seems to be regarded as a fundamental
governmental policy. A citizen "may be compelled-against his will and without re-
gard to his religious convictions to take his place in the ranks of the army of his coun-
try and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense." Jacobson v. Mass., 197
U.S. I, 29 (1905); cf. U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) and U.S. v. Mcintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931) (denying citizenship to aliens who, because of religious belief, re-
fused to take the oath to defend the nation).
In view of the above cases and the fact that the plaintiffs were neither compelled to
go to the state university nor required to enter military service upon the completion of
the course, the court felt that the infringement on religious liberty was not as great as
others previously held constitutional. A desire for less restricted religious freedom and
doubt as to the desirability of military training is reflected in popular criticism of the
case. 51 Christian Century 1651 (i934); 52 Christian Century 8 (,935).. But cf. 81
New Republic 113 (1934); Literary Digest, Dec. 15, p. 7 (934). It would seem, how-
ever, that an organized society cannot allow the performance of this citizenship obliga-
tion to rest solely within the discretion of its individual members.
Legislation providing for optional military training in land grant colleges may be a
possible way to make provision for conscientious objectors. 36 Ops. Atty. Gen. U.S.
297 (193o); i Idaho L. Rev. 9o (1931); though it has been suggested that even this
method is not available. Johnson, Military Training in Land Grant Colleges: Is it
Optional or Mandatory? 24 Ill. L. Rev. 271 (1929).
Corporations-Power of Corporation To Acquire Its Shares-Voting Privileges of
Prior Preference Shareholders-[Virginia].-The capital structure of a corporation con-
sisted of shares of $ioo par value 7 per cent cumulative dividend prior preference stock,
$ioo par value 6 per cent cumulative participating preferred stock, and no par common
stock. By charter provision, so long as the prior preference stock outstanding should
be in excess of $io,ooo,ooo par amount, the holders of such stock were to have the
right, voting separately as a class, to elect a majority.of the board of directors of the
corporation. The charter also provided: (i) that the board of directors could redeem
all or part of such stock on payment of $i1o per share, plus unpaid dividends, such
shares to be cancelled and not to be reissued; (2) that a sinking fund be set up out of
the net earnings for the preceding year for the purpose of retiring such stock. Pursuant
to authority, given by the board of directors, the corporate officers had purchased "for
investment" enough prior preference stock at prices below par to reduce the total
amount held by the public to a figure considerably below $io,ooo,ooo, and the corpora-
tion now holds such shares in its treasury. At an annual meeting the majority of the
board of directors was elected by prior preference shareholders though less than $io,-
ooo,ooo of shares were outstanding and entitled to vote. Plaintiff, owner of 4oo shares
of preferred stock, was granted an order restraining the newly elected board from ex-
ercising its duties on the ground that the election was invalid because the purchase of
prior preference stock by the corporation had reduced the amount outstanding below
$io,ooo,ooo par amount. Held, on appeal, that the injunction be dissolved because the
purchase of the prior preference shares adversely affected a substantial right of such
shareholders, which could not be extinguished except by compliance with charter pro-
visions. Kemp et al. v. Levinger, 174 S.E. 820 (Va. 1934).
On the court's interpretation of the charter, the prior preference shareholders could
